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1. Introduction 
Due to the accumulation of private and public debt,1 Portugal was severely affected by the 
international economic and financial crisis and was, from May 2011 to May 2014, under an 
economic and financial assistance program negotiated between the Portuguese authorities and 
officials from the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Among the structural reforms agreed with the external 
authorities, is a reorganisation of local government administration to significantly reduce the 
number of such entities, to enhance service delivery, improve efficiency, and reduce costs.   
To the best of our knowledge, there is a gap in the literature regarding Portuguese local 
governments’ indebtedness.2 This paper tries to fill this gap by analysing the drivers of 
municipalities’ deficits and debt. Portugal is also an interesting case study because local 
governments are all subject to the same political and administrative rules and laws, mayors have 
substantial autonomy to make decisions, and we have gathered a comprehensive dataset on local 
public finances, electoral results, economic, demographic and social conditions of municipalities, 
covering the entire country, since 1979. 
The average and standard deviation of municipalities’ primary budget balances as a 
percentage of a three-year moving average of revenues without loans, from 1979 to 2011, are 
presented in Figure 1. Over 33 years, only in seven (1979, 1986, 1987, 1995, 2007, 2011 and 2012) 
did municipalities have, on average, a budget surplus. There is a clear pattern of electoral budget 
cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988),3 with a reduction of the average budget balance during electoral 
                                                          
1
 In 2011, private sector debt represented 326% of GPD and public debt 108%. 
2
 Two PhD theses were recently defended on this topic (Ribeiro, 2012; and Lobo, 2013). 
3
 Since the re-establishment of democracy in 1974, local elections occurred in 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 
1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, and in 2013. They were always held in December, except the last three, which 
took place in October. 
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periods, and improvements afterwards. The standard deviation of the budget balance is higher in 
mid-1980s and in the last years of the sample period. 
 
Figure 1. Municipalities’ real budget balance (% of a three-year moving average of real total 
revenues without loans) 
 
 The following graph (Figure 2) shows the percentage of municipalities with deficit in each 
year.4 For most of the years (24), more than half of the municipalities had a deficit. The highest 
percentage of municipalities with a deficit (more than 80%) was reached in 1981 and 1982. There 
is a clear pattern of opportunistic management of local public finances, with an increase in the 
percentage of undisciplined municipalities before elections, reaching a peak during election years, 
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 There are 308 municipalities in Portugal. For 1984 and 1985 data is only available for 172 and 178 
municipalities, respectively. Data for municipalities belonging to the autonomous regions of Madeira (11) 
and Azores (19) are available from 1989 onwards. Three municipalities were created in 1998 (Odivelas, Trofa 
and Vizela).  
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and decreasing afterwards. The years with the lowest percentage of municipalities presenting 
deficits (1979 - 33%, 2011 – 28%, and 2012 – 13%) are associated with the first IMF intervention in 
the country (1977/79), the start of the recent economic adjustment program in May 2011, and the 
shortage of external credit since then. 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of municipalities with deficit (1979-2012) 
 
 Note: Red bars signal local election years. 
 
The accumulation of deficits over time led to a significant increase in debt. As can be seen 
from Figure 3, in six years (20035 to 2009), local public debt as a percentage of a three-year 
moving average of total revenues without loans rose by 33 percentage points, from 76% to 109%. 
Only in 2011 and 2012 there were substantial reductions of the weight of debt, which 
corresponded to 93% of total revenues without loans in 2012 (approximately the average in 2008). 
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There is also a significant increase in the dispersion (standard deviation) of local governments’ 
behaviour until 2009, and a clear pattern of debt accumulation in election years. 
 
Figure 3. Gross total debt per capita ( % of a three-year moving average of real total revenues 
without loans) 
 
Although at the aggregate level municipal public debt only represents around 5% of GDP,6 
there is considerable variation in the behavior of local governments, and some are extremely 
indebted. The lowest value of the weight of debt on total revenue was achieved in Penedono in 
2007, a small municipality of 3 322 inhabitants, and the highest (673%) in Povoação in 2009 (7 
thousand inhabitants). Recently, several measures were taken and a new local finance law was 
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 The debt series used in the paper does not include debt accumulated by local public firms because it is not 
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approved in September 2013 to correct and prevent unsustainable paths. According to the new 
local finance law, a municipality has an excessive debt when its gross debt exceeds 150% of the 
average current revenues over the previous three years. In 2012, 95 municipalities out of 308 
exceeded this limit, and 51 (26) had debts over 225% (300%) of current revenues. The sovereign 
debt crisis created unprecedented challenges to Portuguese local governments which were 
already facing difficulties to obtain funding. Better knowledge on public finance decision-making 
by local governments is therefore necessary to prevent future crises.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the reasons for fiscal 
indiscipline, revising the literature on the subject. Section 3 describes the institutional framework 
in which Portuguese municipalities operate. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis and section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. Reasons for fiscal indiscipline 
Several reasons have been presented in the literature to explain fiscal indiscipline. The common 
pool problem (Tullock, 1959; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981) is one of the most studied. 
When there is no cooperation among decision makers, and political actors can take the full credit 
of additional spending, benefiting significant constituencies, but fail to fully internalize the costs 
that all tax payers must bear, they tend to overspend and to accumulate large and persistent 
budget deficits. In the case of local governments, if they expect to receive funds from the central 
government in case of financial distress, local tax collection will be too low and local spending too 
high. This moral hazard problem in the case of bailout by the central government is known as the 
soft-budget constraint problem (Kornai, 1979; Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003). It has been 
studied, among others, by Velasco (2000), Djankov and Murell (2002), Rodden et al. (2003), 
Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010), Petterson-Lindbom (2010) and Hopland (2013).  
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Pioneering contributions on whether the establishment of fiscal rules is a useful device or 
not to secure fiscal discipline in US states are Holtz-Eakin (1988), Alt and Lowry (1994), Poterba 
(1994), and Bohn and Inman (1996). More recently, Milesi-Ferretti (2003), von Hagen, J. and G. 
Wolff (2006), and Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Wierts (2009) investigated whether the establishment 
of fiscal rules encourages or not creative accounting. Hopland (2013) studied fiscal adjustment in 
Norwegian local governments and the effects of balanced budget regulations. 
Lizzeri (1999) proposes a model of redistributive politics, where politicians care about 
being in office and use deficits to better target promises to voters. For other analyses of the rents 
appropriated while being in office see Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994), Battaglini and Coate 
(2008), and Yared (2010). According to Alt and Lassen (2006), fiscal transparency decreases debt 
accumulation by reducing the electoral cycle in deficits.  
On the effect of political issues on fiscal outcomes, Roubini and Sachs (1989) were the first 
to suggest that political instability leads to larger deficits.7 Persson and Sevenson (1989) and 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) developed models of the strategic use of debt. According to Persson 
and Sevenson (1989) a conservative (liberal) government accumulates more (less) debt when it 
knows it will be succeeded by a liberal (conservative) government, in order to force its successor 
to spend less (more). In the model of Alesina and Tabellini (1990), polarization gives rise to a 
deficit bias irrespective of the ideology of the party in office. The more likely it is that the current 
government will be replaced by a government of different ideology, the larger the equilibrium 
level of debt. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), using data for Swedish local governments, found 
evidence in favour of the Persson and Svensson (1989) model. More recently, Hodler (2011) 
suggested that a conservative government may strategically run a budget deficit not only to 
                                                          
7
 Others have followed, such as Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Persson and Sevenson (1989), Lizzeri (1999), 
Volkering and Haan (2001), and Perotti and Kentopoulos (2002). 
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influence the public spending of the left-wing opposition candidate, but also to influence the 
election outcome. Using data for Spanish local governments, Sollé-Ollé (2006) analyzed the effects 
of party competition on budget outcomes. He found that when the electoral margin of the 
incumbent at the preceding election increased, left-wing governments increased the level of 
spending, own revenues and deficit, while right-wing governments decreased these items.  
Recently, Song, Storeslettten and Zilibotti (2012) developed a dynamic politico-economic 
model of government debt where debt is used by governments to shift the fiscal burden to future 
generations. The larger the political power of the old, the larger the accumulation of debt. 
 
3. Legal and institutional framework 
Portugal is a unitary8 and centralized country, where local governments’ expenditures currently 
represent around 8% of total public expenditures. There are 308 municipalities in the country (278 
of which are in the mainland), all subject to the same legal and institutional framework.   
 During the first years of democracy, municipalities were highly dependent on transfers 
from the central government. Over time, there has been a progressive decentralization process 
with more functions being attributed to local governments, but also more own revenues.9 
Currently, municipalities have responsibilities in the following areas (Law 159/99): rural and urban 
equipment; energy; transports and communications; education; heritage, culture and science; 
leisure and sport; health; social action; housing; civil protection; environment and sanitation; 
                                                          
8
 Administrative regions were established only in the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira. Local 
governments include municipalities and parishes (freguesias), but the latter have very limited functions and 
resources.  
9
 Own revenues are obtained by subtracting transfers and loans from total revenues. In 1979, the first year 
for which local fiscal data is available, own revenues represented 8.5% of total revenues while in 2011 they 
represented 34.5%. 
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consumer protection; promotion of development; spatial planning and urban design; municipal 
police; foreign cooperation. 
Three local finance laws (Law 1/79, Law 42/98 and Law 2/2007) regulated the financial 
system of municipalities during the period under analysis (1979-2011). Taking into account the 
whole sample, the main item of municipalities’ expenditures is the acquisition of capital goods 
(representing, on average, 41.9% of total expenditures), followed by costs with personnel (25.3%), 
acquisition of goods and services (15.9%), current and capital transfers (9.5%), loans (3.2%), 
interest and other financial expenditures (2.3%), and others (1.6%). Municipal revenues consist of: 
direct taxes that include property taxes, property transfer taxes, vehicle taxes, and business taxes 
(14.0%); indirect taxes (1.4%); fees, fines and other penalties (2.1%); property revenues (1.7%); 
capital and current transfers (66.0%); revenues from sales of goods and services (7.4%); revenues 
from sales of capital goods (1.6%); revenues on financial assets (0.2%); and loans (6.2%). 
The first rules regarding municipalities’ ability to contract debt were established by decree 
law 258/79. Since then, several changes occurred, as summarized in Table 1.10 Previous rules have 
been criticized by several authors, namely Cabo (2009) and Lobo (2013). They disagree that the 
limits only applied to the amount and purpose of short term loans, and to expenditures on 
mortgage and interest of medium and long term loans. Therefore, the rules did not take into 
account additional indebtedness or the stock of debt. Furthermore, the limits were set according 
to investment and transfers from the central government, not taking into account the net capacity 
or necessity of funding of the municipality.  This has several disadvantages: (1) a decrease in the 
market interest rate or an expansion in the time for paying the loans increases the legal 
indebtedness limits even without an improvement of the economic situation of the municipality; 
                                                          
10
 A new local finance law was published in September 2013 (Law 73/2013), which came into force in 
January 2014. Since it does not apply to our sample period, it is not described in Table 1. 
9 
 
(2) a reduction in transfers from the central government to municipalities may lead to excessive 
indebtedness, even if the municipality does not contract additional loans; (3) debts to suppliers or 
leasing contracts are not considered; (4) the higher the investment the larger the debt limit.   
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The signature of the Stability and Growth Pact, and the need to have an overall national 
public deficit below 3% and debt below 60%, increased concerns about local governments’ fiscal 
accounts and indebtedness. However, as can be seen from Figure 4, in 2001 local governments 
indebtedness according to the excessive deficit procedure represented 1,5% of GDP and it 
continuously grew until 2007 (3,2%), reaching a peak of 3,5% in 2010. In 2012 it still represented 
3,3% of GDP.  
 
Figure 4. Local governments’ debt (EDP) - % of GDP 
 
Source: Bank of Portugal 
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4. Empirical analysis 
The main objective of the present paper is to analyze the determinants of Portuguese local 
governments’ indebtedness. The panel dataset is composed of annual data on fiscal, economic, 
political and social variables for all 308 Portuguese municipalities, from 1979 to 2012. Data on 
municipal debt were kindly provided by DGAL (Direção Geral das Autarquias Locais) and the 
remaining local fiscal data were collect from DGAL’s annual publication Municipal Finances 
(Finanças Municipais). Political data was obtained from the National Elections Commission (CNE), 
employment data from the Institute of Employment and Professional Training (IEFP) and from the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity (MTSS), economic and demographic data from the National 
Statistics Institute (INE), and socio-economic indicators from the Marktest’s Sales Index database. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 The following two sections present our preliminary results regarding the main 
determinants of Portuguese local government’s indebtedness. The estimations for budget 
balances will use the entire sample, as there is data available for the period 1979-2012. Official 
(DGAL) data on municipal debt is available only from 2003 onwards.  
 
4.1 Budget Balances  
11 
 
The dependent variable in our empirical model for budget balances is the primary budget 
balance11 as a percentage of a 3-year moving average of real total revenues excluding loans of 
municipality i at year t (PBBit). Sets of financial, political, and socio-economic variables are included 
as regressors. Financial variables consist of the first lag of the share of investment expenditures on 
total expenditures (Share_Invit-1), the share of interest payments on debt on total expenditures 
(Share_Interestit-1), and the share of own revenues on total revenues without loans 
(Share_Own_Revit-1). Given that investments generate medium and long term benefits, it is likely 
that municipalities that have a larger share of investment on total expenditures choose to delay 
some of the outlays to the future by having deficits. Own revenues include, among others, local 
taxes and fees charged by local governments, which are more easily perceived by voters than 
those associated with transfers from the central government. Therefore, a positive coefficient is 
expected for the estimated coefficient associated with this variable. Assuming that more indebted 
municipalities want to avoid insolvency, the share of real interest payments on real total 
expenditures is likely to improve the budget balance. 
To capture political issues, the following variables were included:  
- Election Yearit, Before_EYit and After_EYit: represent, respectively, the election year, and 
the years before and after the election year. 
- Leftit: is a dummy for left-wing mayors. According to Persson and Svensson (1989), left-
wing governments are less willing to incur debt than right-wing ones. Alt and Lassen 
(2006) also find support for this hypothesis. We also include a dummy variable for mayors 
not affiliated with any party (Independentit), so that the only partisan dummy left out is 
that for right-wing mayors. 
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 Local finance data is reported in a cash basis. Thus, the overall balance is obtained by excluding the 
transactions in financial assets and liabilities from the totals of revenues and expenditures. The primary 
balance is then obtained also excluding interest payments from current expenditure. 
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- Tenureit: number of years the mayor has been in office. 
- %Seatsit: Percentage of seats held by the mayor’s party in the town hall.  
- Coalitionit: dummy variable for coalition governments.  
- Recandit: is a dummy variable equal to one during the entire term when the mayor runs 
for re-election, and zero otherwise. 
- Same_partyit: dummy variable that assumes the value of one when the mayor and the 
prime-minister belong to the same party. 
Two demographic variables are also included in the baseline model: 
- %65it percentage of the population over 65 years old. 
- Densityit: population density measures the number of inhabitants by squared kilometer. 
Socio-economic variables that may also influence the budget balance are taken into account. They 
are included in the regressions, one at a time. These variables are:  
- Lic_new_constructionit:  Number of licenses for new constructions per inhabitant.   
- Tourismit: Number of touristic facilities per inhabitant.  
- Unempit: Unemployment rate in the municipality. Higher unemployment rates are 
expected to lead to higher expenditures by the local government, namely on social 
aspects, and to lower revenues.  
- %Area_urbanit: Percentage of the municipal area assigned to urban use. Since municipal 
revenues during the sample period were strongly influenced by the amount of 
construction, the increases in the area assigned to urban use are expected to have a 
positive effect on municipal revenues.12 
- Earningit: Real monthly earnings per capita of individuals working in private firms. 
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 Data for %Area_urbanit is not available for the 30 municipalities of the islands of Azores and Madeira. 
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In order to control for the passage of time, we included dummies for each mandate since 1979 
(m1 to m9). The empirical model can be summarized as follows: 
 itmitijti
p
j
jit yy   

 βX ' ,,
1
 iTtNi ,...,1  ,...,1   (1) 
where yit is the dependent variable and p is its number of lags included in the model, 
'
itX  is a 
vector of explanatory variables,  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, i is the individual 
effect of municipality i, φm is the effect of mandate (term) m, and it is the error term.  
 Since in this dynamic panel data model the lagged value of the dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term, it, even if the latter is not serially correlated, OLS, fixed or random 
effects estimates will be inconsistent. As the time dimension of the panel increases, the bias 
reduces but Judson and Owen (1999) found that the bias of the least squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) approach can be significant, even when the number of periods is as large as 30. Although 
the dataset used in the paper covers a 33-year period, the panel is unbalanced, and the average 
number of observations per municipality in most regressions is around 25. Therefore, in the 
sample, there is a clear dominance of cross sections (N=308) over time periods and the fixed 
effects model may still suffer from dynamic panel bias.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
that solves the problems noted above. First differencing (1) removes the individual effects (i) and 
produces an equation that is estimable by instrumental variables: 
 itmtijti
p
j
jit yy   

 βX ' ,,
1
 iTtNi ,...,1  ,...,1   (2) 
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The valid instruments are: levels of the dependent variable, lagged two or more periods 
(yi1,…,yit-2); levels of the endogenous variables, lagged two or more periods (xi1,…,xit-2); levels of the 
pre-determined variables, lagged one or more periods (xi1,…,xit-1); and the levels of the exogenous 
variables, current or lagged (xi1,…,xit) or, simply, the first differences of the exogenous variables 
(xit). More moment conditions are available if we assume that the explanatory variables (xit) are 
uncorrelated with the individual effects (i). In this case, the first lags of these variables (xit-1) can 
be used as instruments in the levels equation. The estimation then combines the set of moment 
conditions available for the first-differenced equations with the additional moment conditions 
implied for the levels equations. Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that 
this extended GMM estimator is preferable to that of Arellano and Bond (1991) when the 
dependent variable and/or the independent variables are persistent.13 
The results of fixed effects estimations are reported in Table 3. As expected, greater 
shares of investment expenditure in total expenditures are associated with lower budget balances, 
and greater shares of interest payments have the opposite effect. That is, municipalities which 
invest relatively more run lower balances, or larger deficits, and those that face higher interest 
payments tend to solve the problem by running primary surpluses. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
share of own revenues is not statistically significant. Thus, the share of own revenues does not 
seem to affect the local governments’ primary budget balances. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
                                                          
13
 Difference-in-Hansen tests indicate that, for our data, the system-GMM is preferable to the difference-
GMM, which only includes the first-differenced equations. 
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The empirical results clearly indicate the presence of a political budget cycle. Not only do 
budget balances tend to be lower in the election year than in any other year of the electoral cycle, 
but also they are lower in year before the elections than in the remaining two years. These results 
are consistent with those of Veiga and Veiga (2007) who found that municipal investment 
expenditures considerably increased in the electoral year and in the year before elections. 
Regarding the remaining political variables, there is some support for the hypotheses that left-
wing mayors (columns 3 to 5), as well as those belonging to the prime-minister’s party (columns 1, 
2 and 6), run more positive budget balances, while the remaining variables do not seem to 
influence budget balances. Regarding, demographic variables, a greater percentage of elderly 
people seems to lead to better budget balances (columns 3 to 5), while population density may 
not matter (it is statistically significant only in column 3). Finally, issuing more licenses for new 
constructions (column 2) is associated with higher budget balances. Surprisingly, the assignment of 
a larger percentage of the municipal territory to urban use worsen budget balances (column 5). 
The other socio-economic variables do not seem to affect budget balances. 
The results for the estimation of the previous models using System-GMM are reported in 
Table 4. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples are reported. T-
statistics are in parenthesis, and the p-values of the autocorrelation and Hansen tests are shown at 
the bottom of the table. Since the absence of second order autocorrelation and the validity of the 
instrument matrix are never rejected, our estimations are valid.14 Most of the variables that were 
statistically significant in the fixed-effects estimations continue to be relevant determinants of the 
budget-balance with the System-GMM estimations. The main difference is that the dummy 
                                                          
14
 Taking into account that the level of indebtedness of the municipality may influence the structure of 
expenditures and revenues, the three fiscal variables included as explanatory variables (the share of 
investment expenditures on total expenditures, the share of interest payments on debt on total 
expenditures, and the share of own revenues on total revenues without loans) were treated as endogenous. 
In order to avoid an excessive number of instruments, only lags 2 and 3 were used as instruments for the 
endogenous variables. 
16 
 
signaling left-wing mayors is no longer statistically significant. Additionally, there is robust 
evidence that municipalities where the mayor’s party has a larger representation in the town-hall 
and dominates the national government have higher budget balances. The demographic variables 
suggest, again, a positive effect of percentages of the population above 65 on the budget balance 
and practically no robust effects of population density. Finally, a larger number of licenses for new 
constructions (column 2) and a lower unemployment rate (column 4) improve the fiscal situation 
of the municipality. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 The political determinants of primary budget balances were further investigated in the 
estimations whose results are reported in Table 5. As in the previous table, there is robust 
evidence of a political budget cycle, as the election year dummy is always statistically significant 
and negatively signed. Results also show that municipalities where mayors enjoy a larger support 
in the Town Hall and belong to the party in the central government have larger budget balances. In 
column 1, we analyzed whether mayors who run again for office would be more or less 
opportunistic than those who do not, by including an interaction between the election year 
dummy and the dummy Recand. Although the estimated coefficient for this interaction is positive, 
suggesting that mayors running for office again internalize the future costs of running deficits in 
electoral years, it is not statistically significant. Column 2 reveals that obtaining a larger margin of 
victory at municipal elections improves the budget balances, but the reverse is true for left-wing 
governments. Sollé-Olé (2006) reported a similar result for Spanish local governments. In the 
following columns, we tested for differences in electoral year budget balances based on strategic 
deficit management: when the local government party changes (column 4), when the mayor 
17 
 
changes (column 5), when the new local government has a different ideology than its predecessor 
(column 6). The dummy variable New_party(mayor)it equals one in municipal election years, when 
a new party (politician) wins the election. According to Allesina and Tabellini (1990) incumbents 
anticipating that they will lose the next election may increase the budget deficit in order to 
constrain the options of their successors. To check the validity of Persson and Svensson’s (1989) 
hypothesis that fiscal policy is used strategically only when a change in ideology is expected by the 
incumbent mayor, a dummy variable equal to one in municipal election years when the Town Hall 
changes from left to right was introduced in the model (Left*New_partyit). None of these variables 
was statistically significant, suggesting that the budget balance is not used strategically by 
incumbent politicians. Finally, we tested if the fragmentation of the Town-Hall, measured by the 
number of effective parties, influences the budget balance. As can be seen in column 6, there is no 
evidence of such an effect. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.2. Debt 
The dependent variable in the empirical model for municipal debt is the real gross debt as a 
percentage of the three-year moving average of total effective revenues (without loans) of 
municipality i at year t (Debtit). As explained above, official debt data is available from 2003 to 
2012. The baseline model includes the same set of financial, political, and socio-economic 
variables used in the estimations for the primary budget balance. Given the short time dimension 
of the sample (10 years), year dummies are included instead of the electoral dummies and the 
dummies for the mandates. Since debt is a persistent variable, the empirical model includes lags of 
the dependent variable in the right hand-side. Because in this sample there is a clear dominance of 
18 
 
cross sections over time periods (N=308 and T=10), only results for the System-GMM15 estimator 
are reported, as fixed-effects results would clearly be biased. 
 As can be seen from Table 6,16 larger shares of interest payments on debt on total 
expenditures increase gross debt. Surprisingly, there is some indication (columns 2, 4 and 5) that a 
larger share of own revenues has a similar effect. Regarding political variables, municipalities ran 
by the party that dominates the national government tend to accumulate less debt. This may be 
due to the fact that governments often try to distribute more grants to municipalities run by their 
party (Veiga and Veiga, 2013). As happened in the previous tables, there is clear evidence of 
political budget cycles. The dummies signaling municipal electoral years (2005 and 2009) are 
highly statistically significant and positively signed, indicating an increase of more than 10 
percentage points in debt over the three-year moving average of revenues in these years. It should 
be noted that 2005 and 2009 were also legislative election years, probably intensifying the 
electoral effects captured by the dummy variables. Additionally, left-wing local governments seem 
to accumulate less debt, while the remaining political variables did not show up as statistically 
significant. Regarding demographic variables, the percentage of elderly does not seem to affect 
municipal debt, while greater population density seems to be associated with lower indebtedness. 
Finally, a higher number of construction licenses issued, a greater percentage of the municipal 
area assigned to urban use, and higher average wages in the private sector firms in the 
municipality are associated with lower indebtedness, while higher unemployment rates have the 
opposite effect. 
                                                          
15
 Difference-in-Hansen tests indicate that, for our data, the System-GMM is preferable to the Difference-
GMM, which only includes the first-differenced equations. 
16
 Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples are reported. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis, and the p-values of the autocorrelation and Hansen tests are shown at the bottom of the table. 
Since the absence of second order autocorrelation and the validity of the instrument matrix are never 
rejected, our estimations are valid. 
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The political determinants of municipal debt were further investigated using models 
similar to those of Table 5 for primary budget balances. As happened for primary budget balances, 
there is no evidence of strategic debt management or that mayors running for re-election increase 
debt more in electoral years than those not running for r-election.17 
  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5. Conclusions 
Results of estimations for municipal primary budget balances and gross debt clearly indicate the 
presence of political budget cycles. In accordance with the rational opportunistic cycles of Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988), mayors manipulate economic local public finances before elections in a manner 
that could signal greater competence. Our results reveal that budget deficits and debt increase in 
the electoral year and, by a smaller amount, in the previous.  
Local government that enjoy greater support in the town hall tend to have higher budget 
balances, and there is also weak evidence that left-wing mayors generate lower levels of debt than 
right-wing ones and independents. No evidence was found for strategic deficit or debt 
management, tenure of mayors, or running again for office. Municipalities where there is party 
similarity between the mayor and the national government tend to have higher budget balances 
and lower debt, which suggests some favoring of these municipalities in the allocation of 
intergovernmental transfers.  
The structure of expenditures and revenues also affects municipal budget balances and 
debt. Higher shares of investment expenditure are associated with lower budget balances, while 
higher shares of interest payments have the opposite effect and increase debt. Regarding the 
                                                          
17
 Although not reported in the paper, the results are available from the authors upon request. 
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effects of socio-economic variables, higher unemployment rates generate higher deficits and debt, 
while issuing more construction licenses seems to generate higher budget balances and lower 
debt. The assignment of a larger percentage of the municipal territory to land use and higher 
average wages in the private firms located in the municipality are also associated with lower 
indebtedness.  
When comparing the electoral effect in the budget deficit and debt it is notable that the 
former is much smaller than the latter, which suggests that extra-budgetary items not included in 
the deficit are reflect in the debt. Preliminary research reveals a substantial difference between 
changes in debt and the deficit that cannot be explained by net expenditures associated with 
financial assets. This is a topic that we intend to explore in the near future. Additionally, we would 
also like to investigate the determinants of different types of debt, namely of financial debt (short-
term and medium and long-term) and non-financial debt.     
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Real Primary Budget 
Balance % 3-y revenues 
9797 -0,683 14,388 -261,512 354,133 
Real Debt % 3-y revenues 8549 176,393 283,007 0,000 673,377 
Share_Inv 9730 40,839 17,525 0,000 121,570 
Share_Interest 9797 2,425 2,938 0,000 51,481 
Share_Own_Rev 9797 26,302 19,110 0,249 124,746 
Election Year 9797 0,260 0,439 0,000 1,000 
Before_EY 9797 0,259 0,438 0,000 1,000 
After_EY 9797 0,267 0,442 0,000 1,000 
Left 9797 0,549 0,498 0,000 1,000 
Independent 9797 0,006 0,079 0,000 1,000 
Tenure 9790 7,357 5,757 0,000 36,000 
%Seats 9787 60,220 12,124 28,571 100,000 
Coalition 9797 0,056 0,231 0,000 1,000 
Recand 9349 0,537 0,499 0,000 1,000 
Same_party 9797 0,386 0,487 0,000 1,000 
%P65 9796 18,736 6,342 5,300 44,183 
Density 9797 0,029 0,087 0,000 1,128 
Lic_new_construction 6933 5,240 3,349 0,000 51,106 
Tourism 6416 0,232 0,402 0,000 5,213 
Unemployment rate 4680 6,202 2,633 0,590 17,399 
% Area Urban 4379 9,990 11,851 0,334 68,772 
Earnings (average) 7529 775,838 167,771 407,994 1904,367 
Margin of victory 9787 19,986 14,750 0,018 87,926 
New mayor 9790 0,058 0,233 0,000 1,000 
New party 9790 0,094 0,292 0,000 1,000 
Effective number parties 9787 2,069 0,454 1,000 4,455 
Sources: DGAL, CNE, IEFP, MTSS, INE and Marktest. 
Note: Sample restricted to the 9797 observations for which there is data on the real 
primary budget. 
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Table 2. Limits to indebtedness over time 
Law Target Limit Exception 
Decree-law 
258/79 
  
 
Medium and 
long term 
loans 
Only for reproductive investments on social or cultural activities, and for rescuing 
municipalities in financial distress. 
Could not exceed 1/12 of the investment expenditures approved in the municipal 
budget for that year. 
Annual expenditures on mortgage and interests could not exceed 20% of the approved 
annual expenditure on investment. 
 
Decree-law 
98/84 
Short term 
loans  
Could not exceed 5% of the Financial Equilibrium Fund.
18
 
Annual expenditures with mortgage and interest associated with long and medium 
term loans could not exceed the highest value of 20% of the FEF or of 20% of last year 
investment expenditure. 
Loans for the construction of houses 
and for the rehabilitation of buildings 
Law n.º 1/87 Short term 
loans  
Could not exceed 10% of the Financial Equilibrium Fund. 
Annual expenditures with mortgage and interest associated with long and medium 
term loans could not exceed the highest limit of 3/12 of the FEF or of 20% of last year 
investment expenditure. 
 
Law n.º 42/98 Medium and 
long term 
loans 
Annual expenditures with mortgage and interest associated with long and medium 
term loans could not exceed the highest value of 3/12 of the sum of the Municipal Base 
Fund and the Municipal General Fund or of 20% of last year investment expenditure. 
 
Decree-law 
n.º 94/01 
Short term 
loans 
Could not exceed 10% of the sum of the Municipal Base Fund, the Municipal General 
Fund and the Municipal Cohesion Fund. 
 
  
                                                          
18
 The financial equilibrium fund was the main transfer received by municipalities from the central government, until the local finance law n. 42/98. 
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Law n.º 16-
A/2002 
Loans Could not contract new loans that implied an increase in net debt during the budgetary 
year. 
Loans for social housing programs, 
construction and rehabilitation of 
infrastructures related to the EURO 
2004, and for projects co-funded 
with EU funds. 
Law n.º 
2/2002 
 In each year, national budgetary laws could establish limits to municipalities’ debt lower 
than those defined in the Local Finance Law.  
 
National 
budget laws 
for 2003 to 
2006 
Debt 
 
Net debt (endividamento líquido) could not exceed the level in 31
st
 December, 2002. 
Annual expenditures with mortgage and interests on medium and long term loans 
could not exceed 1/8 of the Municipal Base Fund, the Municipal General Fund, and the 
Municipal Cohesion Fund, or 10% of last year’s investment expenditures. 
Loans for social housing programs, 
construction and rehabilitation of 
infrastructures related to the EURO 
2004, and for projects co-funded 
with EU funds. 
Local Finance 
Law: n.º 
2/2007 
Debt Total net debt at the end of the year cannot exceed 125% of last year municipalities’ 
main revenues. 
Total debt associated with long and medium term loans could not exceed, at the end of 
the year, the sum of last year’s revenues eligible to calculate the legal limit of net public 
debt. 
Debt associated with short term loans cannot exceed 10% of the amount of total 
revenues eligible to calculate the limit of net public debt. Municipalities that do not 
comply with the limits are subject to sanctions, namely a reduction of transfers from 
the central government. 
 
National 
Budget Law of 
2011 
Debt Total net debt cannot exceed the existing value in September 30
th
, 2010. 
Additional restrictions on medium and long term loans.  
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Table 3. Determinants of the primary budget balance (Fixed Effects) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PBBit-1 0.055*** 0.039* 0.030 0.001 0.016 0.030 
 (3.714) (1.805) (1.247) (0.047) (0.456) (1.547) 
Share_Invt-1 -0.072*** -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.099*** -0.089*** -0.071*** 
 (-4.771) (-3.620) (-3.705) (-3.951) (-3.397) (-4.282) 
Share_Interest t-1 0.920*** 0.951*** 0.955*** 0.809** 0.833** 0.788*** 
 (10.293) (8.426) (7.134) (2.512) (2.478) (6.169) 
Share_Own_Rev t-1 0.022 0.038 0.027 -0.025 -0.014 0.019 
 (1.078) (1.499) (0.868) (-0.637) (-0.342) (0.743) 
Election Year -6.139*** -5.553*** -5.845*** -5.462*** -5.685*** -6.548*** 
 (-13.476) (-11.026) (-11.103) (-8.952) (-9.266) (-12.434) 
Before_EY -2.622*** -1.465*** -1.712*** -1.418*** -1.520*** -2.365*** 
 (-7.087) (-3.893) (-4.314) (-2.923) (-3.078) (-5.631) 
After_EY -1.633*** -2.162*** -2.276*** -2.504*** -2.352*** -1.986*** 
 (-4.275) (-5.382) (-5.128) (-4.928) (-4.464) (-5.241) 
Left 0.536 0.901* 1.500*** 1.768** 1.391* 0.650 
 (1.173) (1.717) (2.741) (2.272) (1.797) (1.305) 
Independent 0.873 1.150 1.687 0.770 -0.524 1.358 
 (0.527) (0.591) (0.895) (0.355) (-0.252) (0.692) 
Tenure 0.034 -0.001 -0.009 -0.029 -0.026 0.015 
 (1.092) (-0.016) (-0.223) (-0.494) (-0.441) (0.424) 
%Seats -0.004 0.004 0.013 0.024 0.026 0.008 
 (-0.300) (0.235) (0.732) (0.908) (0.967) (0.543) 
Coalition 0.289 -0.668 0.031 0.316 0.371 -0.908 
 (0.358) (-0.516) (0.023) (0.197) (0.211) (-0.788) 
Recand -0.568 -0.598 -0.505 -0.214 -0.443 -0.578 
 (-1.361) (-1.072) (-0.803) (-0.245) (-0.454) (-1.266) 
Same_party 0.741** 0.744** 0.564 0.286 0.535 0.656* 
 (2.291) (2.164) (1.569) (0.671) (1.238) (1.909) 
%P65 0.153 0.256 0.340* 0.630** 0.692** 0.289 
 (1.306) (1.637) (1.893) (2.345) (2.545) (1.572) 
Density 11.780 -28.112 -49.185** -34.538  6.660 
 (1.127) (-1.494) (-2.456) (-0.934)  (0.769) 
Lic_new_construction  0.133*     
  (1.807)     
Tourism   -0.561    
   (-0.585)    
Unemp    0.156   
    (0.920)   
% Area Urban     -0.674**  
     (-2.119)  
Earnings      0.000 
      (0.141) 
Observations 8,797 6,434 5,925 4,279 3,992 6,986 
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 278 308 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.100 0.097 0.068 0.076 0.091 
Sources: DGAL, CNE, IEFP, MTSS, INE and Marktest. 
Notes: Fixed effects estimations including dummy variables for mandates. The dependent variable is the primary budget balance 
as a percentage of the 3-year moving average of effective revenues (without loans). T-statistics are between parentheses. 
Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%, **, 5%, and *, 10%.. 
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Table 4. Determinants of the primary budget balance (System-GMM) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PBBit-1 0.128*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.082*** 0.097*** 0.083*** 
 (6.198) (5.267) (4.781) (2.826) (2.860) (4.241) 
Share_Invit -0.274*** -0.218*** -0.196*** -0.236*** -0.210*** -0.302*** 
 (-6.726) (-5.447) (-4.964) (-5.451) (-5.246) (-8.036) 
Share_Interestit 0.960*** 1.005*** 0.997*** 0.383** 0.486*** 0.864*** 
 (11.790) (11.962) (10.423) (2.106) (2.763) (7.977) 
Share_Own_Revit 0.013 0.083** 0.087* 0.072 0.061 0.040 
 (0.375) (2.313) (1.910) (1.443) (1.416) (1.200) 
Election Year -5.680*** -4.399*** -4.747*** -4.713*** -5.132*** -5.902*** 
 (-13.223) (-9.807) (-10.064) (-8.604) (-9.222) (-13.356) 
Before_EY -2.624*** -1.259*** -1.494*** -1.416*** -1.609*** -2.235*** 
 (-7.264) (-3.609) (-4.149) (-2.950) (-3.362) (-5.977) 
After_EY -1.227*** -1.362*** -1.379*** -1.388*** -1.464*** -1.427*** 
 (-3.425) (-3.792) (-3.232) (-2.803) (-2.681) (-3.780) 
Left -0.703 -0.571 -0.461 -0.171 -0.328 -0.341 
 (-1.566) (-1.378) (-1.026) (-0.341) (-0.740) (-0.831) 
Independent 1.684 0.451 0.548 0.812 -0.389 1.072 
 (0.682) (0.213) (0.262) (0.347) (-0.170) (0.439) 
Tenure 0.028 0.003 0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.045 
 (0.913) (0.106) (0.025) (0.316) (-0.017) (1.412) 
%Seats 0.041*** 0.041** 0.038** 0.024 0.029 0.030* 
 (2.687) (2.494) (2.186) (1.197) (1.454) (1.910) 
Coalition -0.459 -1.389 -1.249 -0.879 -1.537 -1.700 
 (-0.534) (-1.137) (-0.991) (-0.639) (-1.241) (-1.544) 
Recand -0.094 0.105 0.247 1.348 1.039 0.605 
 (-0.215) (0.201) (0.431) (1.581) (1.125) (1.345) 
Same_party 0.805** 0.925*** 0.862** 0.843** 0.711* 0.596* 
 (2.426) (2.825) (2.537) (2.030) (1.720) (1.779) 
%P65 0.154*** 0.203*** 0.213*** 0.203** 0.162** 0.207*** 
 (2.795) (3.804) (3.448) (2.422) (2.491) (3.593) 
Density -1.840 -7.075 -9.368* -6.662  -2.863 
 (-0.680) (-1.529) (-1.735) (-1.393)  (-1.129) 
Lic_new_construction  0.193***     
  (3.380)     
Tourism   0.359    
   (0.661)    
Unemp    -0.155*   
    (-1.683)   
% Area Urban     -0.034  
     (-1.098)  
Earnings      -0.003 
      (-1.542) 
Observations 8,796 6,434 5,925 4,279 3,992 7,017 
N. municipalities 308 308 308 308 278 308 
N. instruments 277 287 263 262 261 311 
Arellano-Bond AR(1), p-value 0.000 3.69e-10 2.39e-09 4.79e-06 2.23e-05 0.000 
Arellano-Bond AR(2), p-value 0.627 0.282 0.326 0.222 0.173 0.638 
Hansen, p-value 0.166 0.341 0.244 0.190 0.317 0.360 
Diff Hansen_1, p-value 1.000 0.992 0.995 0.999 0.996 0.996 
Diff Hansen_2, p-value 0.993 0.793 0.774 0.665 0.965 0.558 
Sources: DGAL, CNE, IEFP, MTSS, INE and Marktest. 
Notes: System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models, including dummies for mandates. Sample period: 1979-2011. 
The dependent variable is the primary budget balance as a percentage of the 3-year moving average of effective revenues 
(without loans). Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 5. Additional political determinants of the primary budget balance (System-GMM) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PBBit-1 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 
 (6.206) (6.208) (6.199) (6.197) (6.231) (6.174) 
Share_Invit -0.283*** -0.281*** -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.278*** -0.276*** 
 (-6.761) (-6.707) (-6.733) (-6.696) (-6.722) (-6.639) 
Share_Interestit 0.952*** 0.954*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 0.957*** 0.962*** 
 (11.403) (11.501) (11.624) (11.612) (11.616) (11.528) 
Share_Own_Revt -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
 (-0.327) (-0.321) (-0.281) (-0.264) (-0.303) (-0.276) 
Election Year -4.760*** -4.285*** -4.243*** -4.274*** -4.232*** -4.275*** 
 (-8.507) (-11.360) (-10.542) (-9.658) (-10.541) (-11.310) 
Left -0.585 0.216 -0.602 -0.598 -0.500 -0.580 
 (-1.325) (0.404) (-1.366) (-1.359) (-1.100) (-1.312) 
Independent 1.867 1.737 1.830 1.819 1.821 1.577 
 (0.750) (0.689) (0.732) (0.729) (0.728) (0.620) 
Tenure 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.009 
 (0.465) (0.347) (0.394) (0.332) (0.422) (0.307) 
%Seats 0.038** 0.020 0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 0.076** 
 (2.480) (0.848) (2.364) (2.414) (2.361) (2.525) 
Coalition -0.464 -0.532 -0.490 -0.491 -0.486 -0.405 
 (-0.531) (-0.608) (-0.561) (-0.561) (-0.554) (-0.463) 
Recand -0.397 -0.225 -0.185 -0.168 -0.179 -0.179 
 (-0.837) (-0.506) (-0.421) (-0.365) (-0.408) (-0.405) 
Same_party 0.820** 0.802** 0.839** 0.833** 0.842** 0.828** 
 (2.435) (2.386) (2.481) (2.467) (2.485) (2.465) 
%P65 0.117** 0.123** 0.120** 0.121** 0.119** 0.124** 
 (2.128) (2.236) (2.177) (2.192) (2.161) (2.280) 
Density -0.694 -0.778 -0.612 -0.621 -0.594 -1.023 
 (-0.258) (-0.299) (-0.229) (-0.234) (-0.223) (-0.392) 
Election Year * Recand 0.841      
 (1.234)      
Margin of Victory  0.037*     
  (1.839)     
Left * Margin of Victory  -0.043*     
  (-1.903)     
New party   -0.122  0.171  
   (-0.158)  (0.167)  
New Mayor    0.015   
    (0.020)   
Left * New Party     -0.624  
     (-0.429)  
Number of effective parties      1.171 
      (1.453) 
Observations 8,796 8,796 8,796 8,796 8,796 8,796 
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308 
No. of instruments 276 277 276 276 277 276 
AR(1), p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2), p-value 0.485 0.465 0.469 0.467 0.467 0.468 
Hansen, p-value 0.155 0.147 0.153 0.151 0.153 0.148 
Diff Hansen_1, p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Diff Hansen_2, p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Sources: DGAL, CNE, IEFP, MTSS, INE and Marktest. 
Notes: System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models, including dummies for mandates. Sample period: 1979-2011. 
The dependent variable is the primary budget balance as a percentage of the 3-year moving average of effective revenues 
(without loans). Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 6. Determinants of gross municipal debt (System-GMM) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Debtit-1  0.931*** 0.933*** 0.930*** 0.912*** 0.864*** 0.910*** 
 (16.142) (15.560) (15.886) (16.371) (15.247) (14.305) 
Share_Invit -0.062 -0.076 -0.013 -0.076 0.018 -0.051 
 (-0.588) (-0.712) (-0.156) (-0.696) (0.240) (-0.460) 
Share_Interestit 3.511** 3.374** 3.726** 3.812** 4.914** 4.500** 
 (2.198) (2.048) (2.339) (2.356) (2.379) (2.432) 
Share_Own_Revit 0.160 0.168* 0.136 0.168* 0.276*** 0.169 
 (1.594) (1.664) (1.202) (1.801) (2.994) (1.617) 
Year 2004 3.656*** 3.298*** 4.204*** 3.231*** 4.880*** 4.161*** 
 (2.918) (2.741) (3.776) (2.652) (4.293) (3.600) 
Year 2005 10.060*** 9.440*** 10.914*** 9.412*** 10.401*** 10.761*** 
 (7.853) (7.744) (9.407) (7.144) (9.045) (8.936) 
Year 2006 -0.582 -1.233 0.315 -1.043 0.463 -0.246 
 (-0.295) (-0.656) (0.185) (-0.544) (0.269) (-0.130) 
Year 2007 -5.543*** -6.338*** -4.435** -5.832*** -6.022*** -5.816*** 
 (-2.688) (-2.913) (-2.388) (-2.906) (-3.006) (-2.903) 
Year 2008 -1.498 -2.548 -0.896 -2.194 -3.965 -2.140 
 (-0.555) (-0.889) (-0.350) (-0.791) (-1.342) (-0.763) 
Year 2009 13.365*** 11.987*** 14.387*** 12.201*** 11.594*** 14.213*** 
 (6.571) (5.360) (6.775) (6.189) (6.005) (7.002) 
Year 2010 1.752 0.094 3.145 0.804 4.653* 3.817 
 (0.526) (0.029) (1.096) (0.258) (1.882) (1.144) 
Year 2011 -2.468 -4.079 -1.155 -6.338** -2.112 -1.062 
 (-0.946) (-1.590) (-0.525) (-2.476) (-1.221) (-0.403) 
Left -10.844*** -12.731*** -9.550*** -14.716*** -10.173***  
 (-4.005) (-4.792) (-4.278) (-4.891) (-4.936)  
Tenure -1.739* -1.908* -1.153 -2.139** -1.264 -1.443* 
 (-1.827) (-1.890) (-1.213) (-1.991) (-1.163) (-1.662) 
%Seats -0.108 -0.104 -0.108 -0.101 -0.097 -0.111 
 (-1.454) (-1.392) (-1.533) (-1.443) (-1.240) (-1.543) 
Coalition 0.019 0.028 0.008 0.041 0.024 0.000 
 (0.443) (0.635) (0.193) (1.005) (0.589) (0.011) 
Recand -1.598 -2.044 -1.489 -2.335 -0.997 -1.733 
 (-0.801) (-1.015) (-0.802) (-1.172) (-0.536) (-0.852) 
Same_party 3.497 4.108 2.117 6.237 -3.507 4.441 
 (0.975) (1.093) (0.649) (1.613) (-0.453) (1.231) 
%P65 -1.587* -1.612* -1.551* -1.899** -1.191 -1.827** 
 (-1.931) (-1.918) (-1.883) (-2.249) (-1.475) (-2.136) 
Density 0.094 0.117 0.032 0.181 0.168 0.059 
 (0.599) (0.701) (0.186) (1.090) (1.202) (0.385) 
Lic_new_construction  -0.351**     
  (-2.236)     
Tourism   1.529    
   (1.054)    
Unemp    0.693**   
    (2.447)   
% Area Urban     -0.188**  
     (-2.356)  
Earnings      -0.011** 
      (-2.097) 
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Observations 2,631 2,623 2,631 2,598 2,367 2,470 
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 278 308 
No. of instruments 298 299 269 299 258 306 
AR(1), p-value 0.000118 0.000126 0.000119 0.000110 0.000700 0.000204 
AR(2), p-value 0.780 0.796 0.772 0.152 0.100 0.743 
Hansen, p-value 0.312 0.288 0.150 0.294 0.243 0.365 
Diff Hansen_1, p-value 0.979 0.971 0.992 0.841 0.748 0.997 
Diff Hansen_2, p-value 0.945 0.944 0.770 0.961 0.493 0.764 
 
Sources: DGAL, CNE, IEFP, MTSS, INE and Marktest. 
Notes: System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models, including dummies for mandates. Sample period: 1979-2011. 
The dependent variable is the primary budget balance as a percentage of the 3-year moving average of effective revenues 
(without loans). Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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